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STANDARDS FOR FACILITY SITING:
Uncertain Utility in Decision-Making
Gregory B. Baecher*
Abstract
One approach to regulating private siting
decisions is by setting standards on the impacts
of large constructed facilities. Theoretical
structures of preferences for and among prefer-
ences, however, lead to implications which are
sometimes overlooked in standard setting. Further,
a central issue is that the objective function
describing societal preferences is uncertain.
Analytically including objective function uncer-
tainty in standard setting allows information
from several sources to be quantitatively
coalesced, allows allocation decisions for
investment in preference assessment to be quanti-
tatively analyzed, and leads to speculations on
the handling of temporal changes in preference.
I. Introduction
Suggestions have been made recently (Joskow, 1974) to
regulate siting decisions for large facilities, in particular
for nuclear power installations, through government imposed
standards on non-financial impacts (external costs). These
suggestions reflect a philosophy of government regulation of
*The author would like to acknowledge the support of the
Rockefeller Foundation through its Conflict in International
Relations Program Fellowship, RF 74025 allocation 21, during
the tenure of which the present report was written.
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private decision-making which is not unique, but which
differs from current regulatory policy of agencies such as
the USAEC which monitor the decision-making process itself
by means of project guidelines (USAEC, 1973), rather than
monitoring the impacts of those decisions.
The proposal to use standards as a vehicle for regulat-
ing siting decisions is similar to the use of standards in
health, transportation, and other areas of government regu-
lation. This approach does not alleviate the problem of
decision-making with multidimensional impacts of apparently
non-compatible qualities, but rather transfers it to the
standard setting body. The procedures for making these
standards decisions and for assessing objective functions
by which to evaluate possible alternatives are themselves
open to criticism. In this paper, an attempt is made to
look at standard setting decisions in light of theoretical
structures of preference, and to assess the implications of
approaches which balance beneficial against adverse impacts.
The points which will be concentrated on are that a
balancing approach to standards leads to concepts of decision
which are done injustice by much of current practice in
siting, and that the central theme of standard setting for
facility siting is perhaps more realistically decision-
making with uncertain objective functions. Uncertainty in
objective functions for a balancing approach to standards
is inherent in the problem; if this position is accepted,
then such uncertainty can be directly treated. This leads
to a transference of the problem away from decision-theoretic
aspects and toward assessment aspects; the more effort
invested in assessing objective functions the less error in
the inferences. However, this process suffers diminishing
returns--some of which diminish precipitously due to blocks
in our ability to infer certain preferences from behavior--
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and the question becomes one of investment and allocation.
The points this paper address are simple, but they are often
neglected in practice. Pragmatically, in planning procedures
for standard setting decisions, one should focus on degrees
of uncertainty in objective functions rather than bemoaning
ignorance of them.
To begin, we address the concept of impact balancing and
its theoretical implications; then we turn attention to assess-
ing objective functions and including preference uncertainty
in standard setting. Finally, we look briefly at the admin-
istrative nature of standards and the impact of uncertainty
on those facets of standards.
II. Balancing Approach
The logic of standard setting for impacts of large
constructed facilities is clear: optimal levels of impacts,
whether they be radioactive releases, landscape degradation,
or air pollutant emissions are those levels at which the
marginal rates of preferential substitution among impacts
balance with marginal rates of technically feasible substi-
tution. External costs of large facilities are "public
goods," they are costs shared by society as a whole; internal
costs and benefits are private, they accrue primarily to the
private entity siting the facility. It is therefore in the
interest of private decision-makers to exploit external
costs beyond levels which are optimal for society. By
setting standards on external costs, one attempts to constrain
private decisions within regions of the impact space which
are near the social optimum, that is, regions in conformity
with the resources and preferences of society.
Structures of Preference
Large constructed facilities lead to sets of impacts
against objectives which society holds to be important.
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Abstractly, these might be divided into economic costs and
benefits, environmental degradation, and social disruption,
with subsequent subgroupings of each. Individuals, and thus
society, have preferences for these consequences both for
each alone and for groupings of them; these preferences are
not necessarily linear over levels of anyone consequence
or are they necessarily independent. Thus, in assigning
numbers to preferences for impacts, one must be careful
about changes in the marginal rates of preference as impact
levels change and about the properties of independence which
prevail among impacts of different sorts (Keeney, 1969).
These latter properties may not be constant over the entire
range of impacts, and, therefore, it is marginal changes in
levels of impacts which are of importance and not their
absolute levels. Unit ｣ ｨ ｡ ｮ ｧ ･ ｾ in impacts may lead to
different amounts of preferential change for different base
levels of each impact. This means that traditional method-
ologies for balancing impacts such as cost-benefit and
benefit-risk analysis may not do justice to the true complex-
ity of preference structures, and will lead to near-optimal
balancings only if they approximate the true preference
structure for the region in the impact space which is of
interest. Of course, there is no way of knowing whether or
not they are approximations unless more detailed analyses
of preferences are considered.
The discussion of balancing approaches here will be
couched in terms of measurable utility theory. Whether or
not each parameter of this theory is operationally measurable,
or even whether or not one accepts each axiom upon which the
theory is based will be of little concern. The conclusions
drawn derive from the balancing nature itself and not from
this particular theory. ｾ Ｑ ･ ｡ ｳ ｵ ｲ ｡ ｢ ｬ ･ utility merely provides
a convenient vehicle for discussing the implications of
balancing.
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Let there be some set of objectives which are held
important, and impacts against which will be considered
the criteria for selecting among decision alternatives;
assume that this set of objectives is complete in the sense
of including all impacts of importance. Let there also be
some set of scales or indices upon which to measure impacts
against each objective; these will be called attributes
and denoted ｾ = {xl, ... ,Xnt. Associated with each objective
is one or more attributes and outcomes scaled on the attrib-
utes are assumed to fully describe the importance of all
impacts against the associated objective.
Technical predictions of impacts generated by any
decision alternative (e.g., level of standard) are made
on the attribute scales in the form of probability distribu-
tions. That is, while one may not predict impacts with
certainty, one may predict probability distributions over
the space of attributes, conditioned on each decision
alternative. These predictive functions will be called the
technological relations of a decision. Finally, the prefer-
ability of a set of impacts is measured by a utility function,
ｕ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ Ｌ defined over the attribute space, and the optimal
decision is taken to be that which maximizes the expectation
of utility over uncertainty in the technological relations.
Technological Relations
Most of the siting literature concerns establishing
technological relations (i.e., prediction models). These
relations describe technically feasible combinations of
impacts deriving from the set of decision alternatives; as
such, they must include everything between the plant boundary
and primary impacts. Implicitly, these relations describe
three things: the marginal rate of technical substitution
among impacts, uncertainty in impact predictions, and the
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relationship of secondary (surrogate) standards (e.g.,
radiation release at a facility boundary) to primary impacts
(e.g., changes in morbidity and mortality).
Evaluating technological relations is conceptually
straightforward, even if in practice it is often difficult.
Nevertheless, establishing technological relations is a
problem no matter how a decision is reached, and sophisticated
decision methodologies do little to aid their evaluation.
Assuming even that elements of the physical environment could
be accurately predicted, determination of primary (as opposed
to surrogate) impacts would remain a problem because of
experimental difficulties and lack of experience with similar
impacts. This gross uncertainty in mapping measurable impacts
to primary consequences has been discussed by Hafele (1974)
under the name "hypotheticality," and is an underlying theme
of decision-making with respect to rapidly developing
technology.
Individuals have preferences with respect to what might
be called "basic" attributes, impacts which affect them at
an individual or "quality-of-life" level. Individuals'
preferences for surrogate impacts such as levels of air
pollution, radiation exposure, or land degradation derive
from how these surrogates map into basic impacts such as
health and aesthetic qualities. Most of the assessment
information we have on preferences, however, deals with
surrogates, either in the form of economic data or opinion
survey data. This information is unbiased only to the
extent that individuals, when electing economic behavior or
answering interviewers' questions, clearly perceive the
true mapping onto basic attributes about which one must
presume individuals do have well defined preferences. In
fact, it is not clear that individuals do have a clear
perception of the mapping from surrogate to basic attributes,
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and this accounts for part of the seemingly inconsistent
preferences surrounding certain aspects of risk, for example,
nuclear facilities.
To the greatest possible extent, one should attempt to
assess preferences over basic attributes rather than over
surrogates, even though in practice standards must for
operational reasons be placed on the latter rather than the
former. The reasons for this are straightforward. First,
there is perhaps less error in the perceptions of individuals
for their preferences concerning basic impacts than for
surrogates; they have more intuitive feel for basic impacts,
and thus assessment is easier. Second, perceptions of the
mapping from surrogate to basic impact are often fuzzy and
thus lead to errors not due to uncertainty in preference, but
due to confusion over what impact one's preferences are being
assessed for. Third, preferences over basic impacts have a
greater temporal stability than those over surrogates.
Given that preferences can be assessed over basic
attributes, the mapping from surrogates can be included as
part of the technological relations. Thus, uncertainty in
these mappings can be handled as are other predictive uncer-
tainties.
Quantitative Requirement
Mappings from surrogate to basic attributes are normally
continuous from very low levels and do not display thresholds
which might otherwise be natural breaking points for standards.
Evidence of this lack of thresholds can be seen in many
impacts of large facilities (e.g., Bibbero and Young, 1974;
Morgan and Struxness, 1971; Rice and Baptist, 1974). This
means that comparisons of preferences among alternatives
must be quantitative. Qualitative balancings, priority
lists, and ordinal scalings cannot capture the problem of
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balancing under uncertainty. "Safety" and "benevolence"
and phrases like "low as practicable" simply do not have
meaning in this context.
To treat impacts in isolation and establish "safe"
levels for each means possibly constraining impacts below
the point of balancing (Section 4) and possibly foregoing
beneficial changes in other impacts which might have been
"bought" with the same resources, (either within the context
of impacts generated by the one facility or that of invest-
ment in other facilities). Since investments in preventing
adverse impacts generally follow diminishing returns, incre-
ments of investment above the balancing point could more
efficiently (in a cost-effectiveness sense) be spent in
reducing other hazards or undesirable impacts (e.g., Cohen,
1975) .
Implications of a Balancing Approach
Given a balancing approach to standards, a few implica-
tions vis-a-vis current approaches become apparent.
1. Optimal Standards are Site Specific:
Levels of impacts which are technically feasible depend
on the site; so do exogenous variables (population density,
atmospheric conditions) which also affect the desirabilities
of impacts. If the utility function for impacts is constant
over geographic space, then the point in the impact space
at which expected utility is maximized must also be site
specific.
A facility or set of facilities generates emissions
at points in space as shown schematically in Figure 1.
Through natural processes of atmospheric dispersion and the
like, these emissions lead to a spatial distribution of
impacts (air pollution concentrations, say), which are
Sources
•
•
•
• •
STANDARDS
Natural
Processes
ｦ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ ｦ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ ｵ Ｈ ｾ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ
1.0
Physical Monitoring
Social and Environmental Monitoring
Figure 1
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predicted through a set of technological relations as
f (x), where (y,z) is spatial location. This functiony,z -
depends both on the dynamics of natural processes and on
the source locations. Also distributed over space are certain
exogenous variables, ｾ Ｌ like population, land-use, and natural
eco-systems which are important in establishing preferences.
Together the two sets of variables ｾ and ｾ are arguments of
a utility function ｕ Ｈ ｾ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ Ｌ which is defined societally and
independent of spatial location. The objective function for
standard setting is the integral of this spatial distribution
of ｕ Ｈ ｾ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ with some allowance for its shape (i.e., spatial
equity). Because this objective function is constant while
the predictive relations describing ｾ and § depend on site
location, the level of anyone impact xi at the optimum
depends on the site. Therefore, standards which are specified
uniformly can, at best, only approximate the true optimum xi
for any particular site.
While there has been much discussion of spatial monitor-
ing of pollutant concentrations (Darby, et al., 1974), as
opposed to source monitoring, the only role this monitoring
plays aside from record keeping is to refine the predictive
models we use a priori to make predictions on the spatial
distribution of ｦ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ Ｌ and thus to predict expected changes
in the integral of the preference function ｕ Ｈ ｾ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ ｡ ｳ a result
of different standards. Administratively it has no direct
part to play in standard settingl
2. "Acceptable" Standards cannot be Transferred Directly
from Other Activities:
Different technologies and different sites have different
sets of technological relations and lead to differing values
lThis is not the case if standards are to be used as
dynamic control variables which are continually updated
(Baecher, 1975b), but this is not as they are used in siting.
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of utility at the optimum. However, if the point at the
optimum changes, the level of anyone impact at the optimum
may change as well. Thus, the level of anyone impact
associated with a current technology or siting may not be
directly transferred for a new technology or site without
running the risk of suboptimal standards.
As an example, consider the utility function shown in
Figure 2, defined over the two-attribute space (xl ,x2).
Assume that technological relations A and B correspond to
two technologies or sites or to any two activities. Let
Xl be a measure of health impact and x 2 some other impact,
and assume that only these two impacts are important. In
changing from A to B the optimum level of utility increases,
but the level of impact against xl at the optimum decreases.
I
Therefore, the old level of impact against xl (labeled xl)
is not optimal with respect to the new technology. The new
optimum is ｸ ｾ Ｎ Only the structure of preference for impacts
(e.g., the utility function) may be transferred, and if this
structure is to be transferred it must account for impacts
against all important objectives.
III. Measurement of Preference
Perhaps the central issue in standard setting decisions
is uncertainty in the objective function (e.g., utility
function) used to evaluate alternative levels for standards.
This uncertainty can never be eliminated, or perhaps even
reduced to low levels, so bemoaning ignorance simply side-
steps the central problem and shrugs the responsibility.
Making "best estimates" of preferences or reverting to other
criteria for decisions seem similarly unsatisfactory, while
specifically including objective function uncertainty in
decisions seems the most direct way of treating the problem.
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Figure 2
............... TR-A
............. TR-B
Figure 3
u(!. ｾ Ｉ
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Structures of preference for impacts of large facilities
are based on theoretical constructs of preference, whether
these be utility theory, economic efficiency, or some other
concept; thus we make a leap-of-faith in establishing these
theoretical structures. However, once the structure is
established, uncertainty may be expressed as uncertainties
in the parameters of those mathematical functions.
If we let the societal utility function be ｕ Ｈ ｾ ｉ ｾ Ｉ in
which ｾ is the set of parameters on which the function
depends (e.g., marginal rates of preference changes over
single attributes and rates of interdependency among attrib-
utes), then in assessment we infer probability distributions
over the z. For example, using the economic efficiency
model of preference, the societal utility function is of the
form
[1]
and assessment (here from market data) consists of inferring
the probability function f(Zl,z2, ... ,zn)' With the effi-
ciency model, these inferences usually take the form of
point estimates of ｴ ｨ ･ ｾ Ｎ Using measurable utility theory
the mathematical form of ｕ Ｈ ｾ ｉ ｾ Ｉ is different, but the idea
is the same.
If we adopt a methodology which allows us to analytically
treat uncertainty in the ｾ Ｌ then we are able to make invest-
ment and allocation decisions for the way effort is expended
in assessing preferences. Also, if we adopt a methodology
allowing us to treat uncertainty, we are able to analytically
combine differing types of information (e.g., market informa-
tion, direct questioning) through Bayesian analysis.
Given that we must make decisions with uncertainties in
the objective function, the degree of uncertainty introduced
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by limited assessment information becomes like uncertainty
in technological relations. Different parametric values
for the utility functions lead to different values of utility
for outcomes, and if an agency or individual wishes to make
decisions using societal utilities, then this is simply one
more component of total uncertainty about "states of nature."
An optimal decision is that which leads to a maximization of
expected utility over the probability distributions, both of
the impacts and of the parameters (Figure 3). As these
uncertainties are independent, the expectations over impacts
and parameters may be analyzed in isolation.
Treating parametric uncertainty in utility functions as
uncertainty in the state of nature allows us to approach
assessment tasks {i.e., investment and allocation decisions}
in precisely the same way as other information gathering
activities--by determining the expected value of the infor-
mation to be gained and allocating in such a way as to
maximize the expected increase in utility due to sampling
{Pratt, Raiffa, and Schlaifer, 1965}. Given several
techniques for gathering assessment information and their
associated precisions, we can evaluate the probabilities
of investments in each leading to decreasing uncertainty in
the utility function and, consequently, to increases in
expected societal utility resulting from the optimal standard
level. This affords an analytical procedure for comparing
differing methodologies of assessment and thus for allocat-
ing effort among them.
One must be careful here to distinguish between
"unknowns" in impact and "unknowns" in utility. Most of
the discussion concerning unknowns in siting and standard
setting treats uncertainties in predictions of impacts, and,
in particular, the uncertainties in mapping impact levels
as measured on surrogate scales (e.g., man-rems of radiation)
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onto human or natural attributes (e.g., morbiQity). This is
not the same as uncertainty in the utility function, which is
the degree to which natural impacts are or are not held to
be desirable. The problem of gross uncertainty in impact
predictions is a major one (e.g., Hafele, 1974), but it is
not one addressed here.
Sources of Error in utility Assessment
There are three sources of error in assessing utility
functions of interest groups and, therefore, within the
present context, in assessing utility functions upon which
to base public decisions. The first is error in the responses
an individual gives to preference questions; that is, dis-
crepancies from his "true" preferences either known or
unknown to himself; these include both random error and bias
error. The second type of error is that induced by uncer-
tainty in the "best" parameters of the analytical preference
function which is assigned to his answers; that is, if his
responses are as shown in Figure 4, what is the "best" pref-
erence curve to fit to his answers. The third type of error
is sampling error generated by the fact that only a sample of
all people within a group may be questioned; that is, prob-
lems of sampling inference.
Errors in the responses a subject gives either to an
interviewer's questions or his behavioral responses to
economic situations may either be random, in which the
errors are distributed about the individuals' "true" pref-
erences with an expectation of zero; or they may be systematic
(i.e., bias errors), in which his answers or behavior deviate
in consistent, although perhaps little known directions and
magnitudes from his "true" preferences. The first are easily
handled with statistical techniques and may be reduced by
redundant and more detailed questioning. The second are not
utility
impact
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so easily handled. In fact, risk assessment work currently
underway addresses precisely this question of levels and
directions of bias errors (Otway, 1975).
Simplistically, we might divide bias errors into those
which are caused by lack of information on the part of the
individual or the differences between perceptions of reality
and reality itself, and those of a deeper psychological
nature involving emotional content of the impacts about
which preferences are being assessed.
Slovic (1972), in addressing differences between
perception and reality, has discussed systematic errors made
by individuals in dealing with probabilistic outcomes of
decisions. This work is based on laboratory experiments
initially undertaken by Edwards (1954) and subsequently
expanded by others. The conclusions one draws from this
work is that people are very poor information processors
and thus the answers they give to questions and the behavior
which manifests in economic situations may reflect incorrect
perceptions of reality; thus, one may not directly infer
preferences from this data without correcting for perceptual
biases. Yet Winkler and Murphy (1974) clearly illustrate
that in actual situations individuals do not display nearly
as much error as in laboratory situations. To conclude
from the laboratory experiments that this error does exist
and thus to make corrections on the basis of it has the
potential of leading to grossly erroneous inferences about
preference. Barring further work on human information
processing in real decision situations, it would seem
inadvisable not to accept subjects' direct answers and
behavior as indicators of preferences assuming accurate
perceptions of reality.
Bias errors resulting from more deeply held emotional
or psychological factors are not so readily dismissed,
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given our limited knowledge of the psychology of choice.
But as decisions must be made with current techniques of
inferring preferences, a pragmatic solution is necessary.
There seems little choice open except to accept what
individuals say they prefer in simple choices involving
trade-offs among impacts. Adopting the approach of "what
they would have preferred, if only they knew what they
wanted" transgresses the ethical basis of analysis, and
heavily weighs inferred social preferences by values of the
analyst. As this is a founding tenet of free-market philos-
ophy, it is not a concept without historical support.
The most one can do, perhaps, is to reduce the ques-
tioning of subjects to impacts which are as basic as possible,
and transfer mappings from surrogates to the set of techno-
logical relations. This removes much of the interpretive
mapping to objectively described predictions, and so reduces
questioning to more immediate (to the subject) consequences.
Such an approach may partially overcome the empirical
discrepancies one encounters, for example, in assessing
the undesirability of equivalent levels of traffic and
radiation risks.
One readily admits that speaking of very basic impacts
(e.g., morbidity) and proposing to assess preferences over
these impacts is itself presumptuous. But the whole problem
of psychological biases is one which must be approached
empirically. Just as Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel (1957) were
forced to develop psychologically unbiased random events
for laboratory experiments, so one must "see what works"
practically by trying various strategies of questioning,
reviewing their consistency, and sUbjects' willingness to
deal with them. Work along this line is currently being
attempted by Collins (1973; 1975).
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Errors introduced by constraining individual preferences
to conform with simple (or sometimes not so simple) mathe-
matical relationships cannot be avoided because mathematical
expressions of preference are needed to aggregate and to
express uncertainties. However, this component of error
can be straightforwardly analyzed through a regression
procedure using uninformed prior distributions. If these
errors exceed bounds which seem appropriate for compatibility
(i.e., "goodness-of-fit" in a classical sense), then this
simply reflects on the choice of preference structure and
the analytical model must be modified until the errors
become small.
The major component of uncertainty in inferring group
preferences is probably sampling error, given that satis-
factory ways develop for approaching individual biases.
The reason is that random errors in individual preference
assessments can be made exceedingly small if care is taken
in assessment (Keeney, personal communication, 1975).
Fortunately, sampling error can be directly estimated using
Bayesian sampling theory (Baecher, 1975a). In essence,
this process proceeds as follows: the desired result is a
probability distribution describing uncertainty in the
parameters of the group utility function ｕ Ｈ ｾ ｉ ｾ Ｉ ［ that is,
a probability density function ｦ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ Ｎ Given some sample of
preferences from m individuals within the group, each of
which might be described itself by a probability density
function (pdf) accounting for measurement and fitting error,
ｦ ｩ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ Ｇ i = l, ... ,m, the posterior distribution of uncertainty
on the distribution of parametric values within the group is
ex: ｦｏＨｾｯＩ r: L[f i ＨｾＩ ｉｾｯ｝ L3]
1
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in which ｦ ｏ Ｈ ｾ ｯ Ｉ is the prior distribution and L[eJ is the
likelihood functione A group utility function is constructed
by aggregating the distribution of parametric values across
the group by an appropriate aggregation rule (e.g., Keeney
and Kirkwood, 1974).
An intriguing property of this procedure for inferring
uncertainties in group preference is that information other
than direct assessment data may be analytically included in
the form of the prior distribution, ｦ ｏ Ｈ ｾ ｯ Ｉ ･ For example,
market data on the impact in question can be summarized as
a prior distribution of possible parameter values for the
preference function, and then updated by subsequent interview
data to yield a composite uncertainty. This allows one to
combine seemingly incompatible types of preference infor-
mation into a single estimate of parametric values, with
associated uncertainty. Likelihood functions for the sub-
sequent directly assessed data might be determined using
multidimensional scaling (Shepard, 1964), regression pro-
cedures (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971), or a variety of
other methods (e.g., Wilcox, 1972). Non-parametric approaches
to methodologically similar problems have been developed by
Jewell (1975).
Sources of Information for Preference Assessment
The traditional approach to assessing societal prefer-
ences has been to infer from economic (i.e., market) data
on marginal prices people are willing to pay either to
enjoy some impact or to avoid it, sometimes called the
inferred preferences method. This forms the assessment
basis of cost-benefit analysis, for example, as well as
Starr's (1970) benefit-risk analysis. The central defi-
ciencies with this method are:
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1) It treats historic data which may not reflect
current preferences.
2) It deals only with impacts for which we have
extensive experience.
3) It implicitly assumes simple determination of
preference in terms of economic indices which may
fail to grasp the mUltiply determined nature of
individual choices, and which fail to distinguish
between perception and objective impacts.
4) It assumes independence between impacts of different
types and a linearity of preference (fixed at
current marginal rates) over levels of anyone
impact. Thus, it implies structures of preference
which do injustice to its true complexity.
The second traditional approach has been opinion surveys
｜ ｾ ｬ ｩ ｣ ｨ directly approach individuals and ask their opinion in
Sil11ple agree/disagree or choice among certain impact questions.
'rh'! major deficiencies with this approach are that:
1) It treats and measures perceptions of impacts rather
than preference for objective impacts (e.g., in
measuring the preference for impacts measured on
surrogate attributes the subject must supply the
mapping to natural attributes--which may only, in
tenuous ways, reflect the true mappings) •
2) They measure intent of behavior in decision situations
rather than behavior. There is no way ot insuring
that those things which individuals say they prefer
are actually those they choose in ｾ decisions.
Although it is certainly not clear whether the
pensive reflection attempted in direct assessment
is not a better ｩ ｾ ､ ･ ｸ than the active choices people
make with unspecifiable motivations.
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3) The results of opinion surveys are notoriously
unstable (i.e., they change rapidly).
4) They generally lead to qualitative rather than
quantitative relations among preferences for
different types of impacts, and often allow little
way of inferring trade-off rates of preference among
different impacts (which is the most important
information for decision-making).
At present too much emphasis is being placed on historic
preference information (mostly market data) and too little on
data from direct questioning (Otway and Cohen, 1975).
Two direct techniques for assessing preferences which
might be applied more extensively are utility assessment
(Schlaifer, 1959) and the decision inference methods of
behavioral psychology (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971;
Shepard, 1964). Both these sets of methods allow quantita-
tive inferences about rates of trade-off among differing
impacts and on marginal rates of preferential change with
varying levels of individual impacts.
The most important parts of assessment techniques
which these latter methodologies allow consideration of
are: 1) the completeness of indices used in capturing
trade-offs employed by individuals in reaching decisions,
and 2) the sensitivity of the methods as expressed in error
levels on the quantification of preference. Without the
second, one is limited in the way one makes allocation
decisions among assessment investments.
Three requirements of a satisfactory assessment method-
ology would be that it:
1) Separate perception of impacts from objectively
specified levels;
2) Account for multiattribute determinacy and quantita-
tively handle preferential trade-offs among impacts;
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3) Quantify uncertainty in inferred structures of
preference.
Based on the preceding discussion, a proposed methodology
for preference assessment for impacts of large facilities
would be the following. It should use a limited number of
attributes of impacts so that interdependencies among
impacts may be adequately explored; it should use the most
basic attributes possible to reduce emotion laden questioning;
it should not correct either for subjective probability or for
psychological bias (as the allocation of mappings from surro-
gate attributes to basic attributes would be contained in
technological relations); it should use economic data as
prior information which is subsequently updated by direct
utility or other assessment data; and it should analytically
express uncertainty in assessment through a scheme which
includes both uncertainty in individual assessments and
sampling inference.
Time Changes in Preference2
We have dealt so far with current uncertainty in objective
functions. However, a taxing question is what do we do with
societal preferences which change over time. Siting and
associated standard setting does not, in general, deal with
long-term impacts, but rather with design lives of interme-
diate length and small-scale decisions. Thus, our immediate
concern is pragmatic and this is the temporal problem we
address.
One takes a leap-of-faith in choosing a structure for
the objective (preference) function. If one assumes that
this structure (although perhaps not the actual values of
2The impetus and inspiration for this approach has
resulted from discussions with Harry Swain (personal
communication, 1975).
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its parameters) is constant over time, then one may express
temporal uncertainty just as sampling uncertainty, by estab-
lishing probability distributions on the set of parameters.
If the structure itself changes over time the problem is
entirely different, and it is this latter problem which must
be addressed by such things as long-term energy policy.
Structural changes include qualitatively new ways of per-
ceiving the importance of impacts (not simply changes in
magnitude), as well as the recognition of previously ignored
or unnoticed impacts. Here, however, we focus on the
problem of time invariant structures of preference in which
the parametric values have uncertain time streams.
Expanding our notation, let the societal utility func-
tion previously denoted ｵ Ｈ ｾ ｉ ｾ Ｉ refer now to some increment
of time ｾ ｴ ｯ ［ this will be represented as ｕ Ｈ ｾ ｴ ｯ ｬ ｾ ｴ ｯ Ｉ where
ｾ ｴ and ｾ ｴ are the values of impacts and parameters during
o 0
the interval ｾ ｴ ｯ ﾷ Both ｾ ｴ and ｾ ｴ are uncertain, but may
o 0
be represented by some joint probability density function
denoted f t ＨｾｉｾＩ (Figure 5). Estimating the function f t ＨｾｉｾＩ
o 0
is a difficult task, but is being attempted in such under-
takings as the Vancouver Urban Futures Study (Collins, 1973);
clearly, the further into the future these predictions are
made, the more variance there will be in the estimation.
Here we will assume that such estimations can be made, and
that imprecision in our ability to make this prediction can
be included as increased variance.
The preference for ｩ ｭ ｰ ｡ ｣ ｾ ｳ during the interval ｾ ｴ ｯ is
simply the utility function given ｾ ｴ and ｾ ｴ ; allowing for
o 0
uncertainty and adopting expected utility as the criterion
of optimality, the "best" decision alternative for the
period ｾ ｴ ｯ is that which maximizes
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[4 ]
Assuming no time discounting of utility, the best current
decision alternative is that which maximizes 3
ｅｴ｛ｵＨｾｉｾＩ｝ = J J J ｕＨｾｴｬｾｴＩ ｦｴＨｾｉｾＩ dz dx dt
t x z
[5]
As long as the structure of preference over impacts remains
stable, the nature of utility functions handles problems of
risk aversion to future uncertainties of impacts and param-
eters, and thus the analysis is not merely an averaging of
impacts over time. The problem for intermediate interval
decisions thus reduces to parametric estimation, and our
inability to accurately predict changing magnitudes of
preferences among impacts is reflected in the dispersion of
our probabilistic estimates of time streams of those param-
eters.
IV. Administrative Aspects of Standards for Siting
We have discussed the theory of standard setting as
balancing impacts against a host of societal objectives to
yield a social optimum. We have also pointed out that we
consider the central issue in all of this to be the logic
of decision-making with uncertain utility functions. However,
3complex theoretical structures of temporal utility
aggregation could be applied to this sort of approach (e.g.,
Meyer, 1969) but the thrust of the argument would remain
unchanged.
- 26 -
standards are fundamentally administrative entities which
we adopt in order to better regulate private decision-
making. Therefore, we now turn brief attention to ways of
specifying standards which will, in theory at least, best
accomplish this aim.
Legal and Administrative Nature of Standards
Elements within society have different structures of
preference over impacts associated with large facilities and
administratively we institute standards so that actual
decisions will be brought closer to societal optima than
individual preference structures would otherwise lead to.
Since many of the impacts of large facilities are of a
public good nature (air pollution, etc.), it is in the
interest of individual decision-makers to exploit these
costs to a greater degree than is in the societal interest.
These points refer not only to industrial decision-makers,
but also to interests such as environmental groups whose
structures of preferences also do not necessarily coincide
with societal structures. For example, air pollution
standards which are too stringent are no more in the "public
interest" than ones which are too relaxed. To err on the
side of "safety" is to err on the side of increased costs--
both social and environmental, as well as financial--of
other impacts. One of the clearest examples of this is
Majone's (1974) on air pollution standards. Increasingly
strict air pollution standards in many cities have caused
increasing loads on other facilities for removing wastes
(e.g., water and solid waste); this means increased degra-
dation of water and landscape quality, as these are the new
depositories of what was air pollution waste. It may be in
"society's" interest to have less stringent air standards
and thus less water and land degradation, even though
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activist groups continue to push for more and more stringent
air standards.
There are several ways in which private decisions may
be encouraged to approach societal optima, and standards as
they are now used is merely one of them. For example, one
may set standards as (Keeney, 1974):
1) Minimum or maximum levels of impacts as now
employed.
2) "Windows" which specify maximum and minimum levels of
given impacts.
3) MUltivariate limits on several impacts simultaneously.
4) Specifications of societal objective functions or
marginal rates of trade-off between impacts of
different types.
The first three monitor the results of decisions, the
fourth monitors decision-making.
The advantage of monitoring standards rather than
decisions is that the licensing process is speeded, the work
load of administrative agencies is reduced, and the regula-
tory agencies, ostensibly, are better able to judge the
preference structure of society and invest more resources
in assessment and analysis than private decision-makers.
Thus, ostensibly, there should be less error in the agency
inferred utility function, and the level of standards
selected by them may be more nearly optimal than are site
specific optimal impact levels analyzed with fuzzier infor-
mation.
The typical case of individual standards on the level
of a single impact is illustrated in Figure 6. As both
the technological relations (TR's) and the utility functions
are uncertain, however, the societal optimum can only be
described as some probability density function over the
impact space. Given TR-A and a private utility function
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as shown, a standard can be set such that the private deci-
sion is constrained to lie near the probable societal
optimum. However, if TR-B actually prevails, the standard
is too strict and an unconstrained private decision might
have led to a more nearly optimum balancing. Such a
standard assumes a "target" group of decision-makers, and
if another group, which placed more importance on the second
impact, were influential in the decision, then again the
private decision would diverge from the probable social
optimum. Without a specified target group, window standards
or joint standards on both impacts would be needed to insure
a near optimal balancing. These are shown respectively in
Figures 7 and 8.
Window standards suffer the disadvantage that they are
politically unacceptable since they specify minimum levels
of undesirable impacts and maximum levels of desirable ones.
Thus, they are easy political prey for groups whose prefer-
ence structures diverge from the societal structure, and are
difficult to justify publicly. Joint standards are more
easily justified as the trade-off relationship between
impacts may be more directly indicated. If one is to adopt
joint standards, however, there seems no reason not to go
directly to sliding scales of joint levels which reflect
marginal rates of trade-off among impacts. Again, this is
illustrated for the two attribute cases in Figure 9.
Adopting a sliding scale implicitly grades into speci-
fying societal preference trade-offs themselves, but perhaps
avoids the political difficulty of being overly exact in
stating a precise surrogate "welfare function." Specifying
an expected societal preference function or a range for this
function, expressed in marginal rates of trade-offs among
impacts, certainly seems most likely to lead to near optimal
decisions but requires careful monitoring of siting decisions
/ .. ＬＯｾ
.' ,
" ,
.,,- ,,'
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themselves and is thus more difficult to implement. At
present, regulatory agencies, such as the USAEC, use precise-
ly this procedure, except that they allow private decision-
makers to assign the societal rates of trade-off from their
own analysis and then monitor not only the decision analysis
itself, but also the inferences of societal preferences
(USAEC, 1973).
A last point is that any way one sets standards must
account for uncertainty in impact predictions. Not doing so
means that decisions must be made below societal optima
in order to insure the required low probability of violation.
Whereas a balancing of impacts at point 1 in Figure 10 may
most closely approach the societal optimum, to insure a
satisfactorily low probability of violating the standard, a
private decision would have to be moved toward point 2--a
balancing which has an expected societal utility more removed
from the optimum. This philosophy of standards is gaining
acceptance in some applications (e.g., in air pollution,
Bibbero and Young, 1974), but should be more widely employed
in siting.
Technological Change
If one adopts standards of either the level or window
type, the best levels to choose depend on the set of techno-
logical relations. If this set of TR's changes, the best
standards change. Therefore, the standard setting agency
must constantly evaluate and update its standards to reflect
technological change. As the TR's change, if the standards
do not also change, then they force private decisions perhaps
away from social optima. Given some technological advance
which lowers the TR from 1 to 2 in Figure 11 (this might
be, e.g., decrease in the marginal cost of lowering pollution
emissions), the social utility at the optima increases from
- 32 -
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a to b, but the absolute level of adverse impact B also
increases as the optimum changes. With the new technology,
maximum increase in social utility can only be realized by
making the standard on B less rather than more restrictive.
Leaving it the same leads to some increase in utility, but
not as much as might be attained. Making the standard more
stringent leads to inconsequential increases or even decreases.
One of the major advantages of level and window standards
is that they become targets or goals of administrative
endeavor. Their success is strongly tied to their fixity
and permanence. By changing standards too often they lose
their advantage of providing an administrator with a constant
yardstick (Majone, 1974).
This flaw does not so much mar the use of trade-off
rates as their permanence depends on the preferences of
society, which although changing, presumably do so at slower
rates than technological advance.
v. Conclusions
Standards imposed on levels of impacts generated by
large facilities are vehicles for regulating private siting
decisions in such a way that levels of impacts against mu1ti-
attributed objectives of society may be balanced. Based on
theoretical structures of preference for uncertain impacts,
however, certain implications become clear which are some-
times overlooked in practice. First, optimal standards
(i.e., optimal levels of impacts against anyone -objective)
are site specific; they change with site and facility tech-
nology. Second, "acceptable" levels of impacts against any
one objective for one site, technology, or activity may not
be directly transferred to new sites or technologies and still
be optimal.
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The central issue in decision-making for standard setting
is perhaps best described as decisions with uncertain utility
(i.e., objective) functions. Adopting a quantified approach
to objective function uncertainty allows one to compare
different assessment methodologies, allocate effort among
them, and quantitatively aggregate information from seemingly
incompatible sources (e.g., market and direct assessment
data). Also, given a quantified approach to objective func-
tion uncertainty allows speculation on quantified approaches
to treating the problem of temporally changing preferences
for and among impacts.
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